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[L.A. No. 22300. In
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14, 1953.]

ALBERT YORBA et aI. t Appellants, v. ANAHEIM UNION
WATER comANY (a Corporati0D:) et aI., Respondents.
[1] Adverse Possession - OontiDuit7 of Possession - B7 Suit.While ordinarily the flliDg of an action. either by person
asserting a prescriptive right or by person against whom th"
statute of limitations is running, will in~pt running of
prescriptive period and statute will be tolled while action is
actively pending, an action that has been dismissed or abandoned does not interrupt running of prescriptive period.
[1] Time covered by pendency of suit discontinued without decision on merits as included in computation of period of adverse
possession, note, 80 AL.R. 439. See, also, Oal..Tur.2d, Adverse
Possession, § 60; Am•.Tur., .Adverse Possession, § 180 et seq. ,
McR. Dig. References: [1] Adverse Possesllion, § 82; [2] Waters,
1120; [3] Waters, i 730; [4, 5] Waters, i 737(7).
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(2) Waters-Prescriptive Rights-Bringing of Suit as htemption.-Where plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, as owners of
land bordering a river, could have secured a final adjudication
on the merits of their riparian rights in an action instituted
by a water company to quiet title to that portion of water
which it had been diverting from river at a point above plaintiffs' land, but instead, after entry of a preliminary injunction
zestraining them and certain irrigators from interfering with
auch diversion, abandoned the action and acquiesced in an arrangement whereby water company and irrigators secured
half of normal flow of river to their exclusion, the action did
not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, and the
preliminary injunction did not toll the statute where it did
prevent plaintiffs' predecessors in interest from asserting their
rights or from establishing their rights by legal action. (See
Code Civ. Proe., § 356.)
[3] Id.-Procedure in Water Litigation - Evidence - DiversionWaste.-An implied finding that water diverted from river by
defendant water company at point above plaintiffs' land has
been applied to beneficial use without waste is sustainoo by
evidence that the water has been used for irrigation, that the
supply is frequently short, that in more recent years it has
been necessary to augment water diverted from river by pumping from wells, that water company was endeavoring to conserve water supply, and that an arrangetnent had been made to
have water company deliver water from its canal to ditch of
defendant irrigation company instead of releasing water into
river bed so that irrigators could divert it downstream.
[4] ld.-Procedure in Water Litigation-Findings.-ln action by
owners of land bordering on river to establish a servitude in
eanal of defendant water company, based on conditions contained in deeds whereby plaintiffs' predecessors in interest
granted an easement to another water company for construction of the canal across their land, it is unnecessary to
decide whether such conditions were sufficient to create a
servitude in canal in favor of grantors that would be binding
on successors in interest of grantee, where defendant's predecessor in interest acquired the easement by prescription and
not by conveyance froL} the other water company, and where
trial court could reasonably conclude that defendant, in a prior
action involving its right to divert water from river, asserted
its rights in canal adversely, not only to other water company,
but also to plaintiffs' predecessors in interest.
(5) ld.-Procedure in Water Litigation-Findings.-ln action to
establish priority of plaintiffs' riparian rights over any rights
defendants might claim in river, any error in finding that
certain parcels of plaintiffs' land no longer have riparian rights
immaterial where defendants have established a superior
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prescriptive right against plaintilfs to divert the half of the
Dormal surface flow of river which is at issue into canal across
plaintiffs' land.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County. Robert Gardner, Judge. Affirmed in part and re.
versed in part.
Action to quiet title and for declaratory relief. Judgment
declaring plaintiffs owners of certain riparian rights, determining prescriptive rights of defendants to divert portion
of water from river, etc., affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Harry M. Irwin, Forgy, Reinhaus & Forgy and Fred Forgy
for Appellants.
H. C. Head, It. C. Mize, Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether &
Rindge, T. B. Cosgrove, Head, Jacobs & Corfman and H. C.
Head for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiffs are the owners of 21 parcels of
land located on the north side of the Santa Ana River in
Orange County. In 1874 this land was all riparian to the
river and consisted of the Prudencio Yorba, Vicente Yorba,
and William McKey allotments of the Rancho Canon de Santa
Ana. These allotments were contiguous and each abutted on
the river. They were brought under the common ownership
of Prudencio Yorba by 1879, and since that date plaintiffs
have succeeded to his interest. Approximately 5 miles upstream to the east of the easterly border of plaintiffs' land
is the intake of defendant Anaheim Union Water Company's
Cajon Canal. This canal runs in a generally westerly direction
on the north side of the river and carries the river water across
plaintiffs' land for use on land lying downstream and to the
west thereof. Approximately a mile and a half apstream to
the east of· plaintiffs' land on the south side of the river is
the intake of the Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Company
eanal. Water diverted into this canal is used on land lying
to the south of the river. At the present time the Anaheim
company divides the normal surface flow of the river into two
equal parts and diverts half of it into its Cajon Canal. The
remaining half is diverted by the Santa Ana company before
it reaches plaintiffs' land. From the Cajon Canal, the Anaheim company delivers 100 miner's inches of water for use
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on land lying upstream from plaintiffs' land, 200 inches to
defendant Yorba Irrigation Company for use on land lying
downstream from plainti1is' land, and it supplies the remainder of the :flow to its stockholders for use on their land
lying downstream from plainti1is' land. Various of the plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest tapped the canal with
pipes at seven locations and used the water taken through
these pipes on their land.
In 1949 plainti1is filed this action against the Anaheim
Union Water Company and the Yorba Irrigation Company.
In their first cause of action they alleged that their land was
riparian to the river, and they sought to establish the priority
of their riparian rights over any water rights defendants might
claim in the river. By their second cause of action they sought
to establish a servitude in the Cajon Canal. They alleged
that they were entitled to the free use of water from the
canal for watering stock and for domestic purposes and to
the privileges of stockholders in the Anaheim company in
obtaining water for other purposes. This claim was based
on conditions contained in deeds, executed in 1876, by which
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest granted an easement to
the Canon de Santa Ana Water Company for the construction
of the Cajon Canal.
The trial court found that certain parcels of plainti1is' land
were riparian and that others had lost their riparian rights
either by conveyances of water rights or by severance of contiguity with the river. It further found that defendants'
predecessors in interest had acquired the Cajon Canal and
easements therefor across plainti1is' land by prescription and
not by virtue of any conveyance from the Canon de Santa
Ana Water Company, and that, prior to 1903, the Anaheim
company had acquired by prescription the right to divert one
half of the normal surface :flow of the Santa Ana River into
the Cajon Canal and carry such water across plainti1is' land,
subject to the right of certain upstream owners to receive
100 miner's inches and the right of the Yorba company to
receive 2'00 miner's inches. It also found, however, that certain of the plaintiffs had acquired by prescription the right
to divert water from the canal through the seven pipes hereinabove mentioned. Judgment was entered accordingly, and
plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence to support the
finding that the full prescriptive period had run against them
prior to 1903. Defendant Anaheim Union Water Company
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was organized in 1884 and succeeded to the rights of various
smaller water companies that had been diverting water from
the north bank of the Santa Ana River. It did not, however,
succeed to the water rights of the irrigators who were diverting water by means of the Yorba ditch. These irrigators later
conveyed their water rights to defendant Yorba Irrigation Company, and their land, which is now supplied by the Yorba
company, lies downstream from plaintiffs' land. In 1885
the Anaheim company brought an action against plaintiffs'
predecessors in interest and the Yorba irrigators to quiet
title to one half of the water of the river less 125 miner's
inches, and to enjoin the defendants from diverting water
to which the Anaheim company claimed it was entitled. It
alleged that it owned various ditches and canals, including
the Cajon Canal, and that the defendants were interfering
with its rights by diverting as much as 400 inches of water.
The defendants answered and denied that the Anaheim company was the owner of the Cajon Canal or the water rights
claimed and alleged their own prescriptive rights to continue
diverting water from the river. Although both the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs in the present action and
the Yorba irrigators were named as defendants in the 1885
action, it appears that the primary purpose of that action was
to establish the respective rights of the Anaheim company
and the Yorba irrigators to the half of the flow of the river
being diverted on the north side. Thus in 1891 a preliminary
injunction was entered in that ao::tion whereby the defendants
were enjoined from interfering with the Anaheim company's
diversion on condition that th Anaheim company deliver
200 miner's inches from the Cajon Canal into the Yorba
ditch. In 1903 the place of dt]very of the water specified
in the injunction was change.~ by agreement of the parties,
but in all other respects the p!'-::iminary injunction was left
in effect. The Anaheim eo!:.:;:~y and the Yorba irrigators
and their successor, defen~: Yorba Irrigation Company,
were satisfied with this di";..£:::: of water, and it is still in
effect. No further procee-f:-r r: :.ave been taken in the 1885
action, and it is still pena:·:
It is clear that if the di,~:-::: and division of waters formalized in the 1891 prelir-:~ <:- :njunction had been effected
solely by adverse use with-:-::: ~~ intervention of legal action,
and if the water diverted h: :,,:,:u devoted to beneficial use,
defendants in this actio~ -v--:--": have perfected their prescriptive rights against r' s' .• , before 1903, as the trial
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court found. Plainti1Is contend, however, that there is no
evidence that the Anaheim company had diverted half of
the normal flow of the river before the 1885 action was filed
and that the filing of that action stopped the running of the
preScriptive period against them. [1] It is true that ordinarily the filing of an action, either by the person asserting
a prescriptive right, or by the person against whom the
statute of limitations is running, will interrupt the running
of jhe prescriptive period, and the statute will be tolled while
the action is actively pending. (Knoke v. Swan, 2 Cal.2d
630, 632 [42 P.2d 1019, 97 A.L.R. 841] ; Estate of Richards,
154 Cal. 478, 488 [98 P. 528] ; Alta Land etc. 00. v. Hancock,
85 Cal. 219, 228 [24 P. 645, 20 Am.St.Rep. 217]; Spotts v.
Hanley, 85 Cal. 155, 170 [24 P. 738] ; Newman v. Bank of
Oalifornia, 80 Cal. 368, 373 [22 P. 261, 13 Am.St.Rep. 169,
5 L.R.A. 467].) On the other hand, however, an action
that has been dismissed or abandoned does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period. (Langford v. Poppe,
56 Cal. 73, 76-77; Breon v. Bobrecht, 118 Cal. 469, 470 [50
P. 689, 51 P. 33, 62 Am.St.Rep. 247]; Dong Ohun Len v.
Luke Kow Lee, 7 Cal.App.2d 194, 196 [45 P.2d 827]; Gi"bbs
v. Lester, (Tex.Com.App.) 41 S.W.2d 28, 32, 80 A.L.R.
431; Thompson v. Ratcliff. (Ky.App.) 245 S.W.2d 592, 594;
see anno., 80 A.L.R. 439.)
[2] The facts of the present case bring it within the foregoing rule. Under the pleadings in the 1885 action plainti1Is'
predecessors in interest could have secured a final adjudication on the merits of their riparian rights in the river and
thereby have prevented defendants from acquiring any new
prescriptive rights after that action was filed. (Newman v.
Bank of Oalifornia, supra, 80 Cal. 368, 373; Spotts v. Hanley,
supra, 85 Cal. 155, 170; Breon v. Robrecltt, supra, 118 Cal.
469, 470.) They did not do so, however, but instead abandoned the action and acquiesced in an arrangement whereby
the Anaheim company and the Yorba irrigators secured
half of the normal surface flow of the river to their exclusion.
The preliminary injunction did not, as plaintiffs contend, toll the statute by preventing their predecessors in
interest from asserting their rights. (See Code Civ. Proc.
§ 356; Elliott ~ Horne v. Chambers Land Co., 61 Cal.App.
310, 312 [215 P. 99].) Although the injunction prevented
them from physically interfering with the Anaheim company's diversion, it did not prevent them from establishing
their rights by legal action.
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[3] Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence that the
water diverted by defendants has been applied to beneficial
use without waste. There is evidence, however, that the
water has been used for irrigation and that the supply is
frequently short. In more recent years it has been necessary
to augment the water diverted from the river by pumping
from wells. Plaintiffs rely on a statement made in a report
of the state engineer published in 1888 that the Anaheim
company's works "are not economical of the supply." Read
in context, however, the engineer's statement does not indicate that water was being wasted. His report stated that
"The supply of water for this district [supplied by the Anaheim company] is short. As to the actual facts with respect
to volumes, those, as far as known, will be found in the special chapter on water-supply, to follow. The works are not
economical of the supply. A perfected system would probably greatly relieve the district from embarrassment on this
score. The problem is not a simple one. Just what should
be done for economy's sake and to insure best results is a
point not to be quickly or lightly determined." The report
also pointed out the difficulty of preventing loss of water
through seepage into porous soil. There is evidence that the
Anaheim company was endeavoring to conserve the water
supply. The intake of the Cajon Canal was located well upstream to prevent loss of water in the sandy bottom of the
lower river. It may be inferred that the Anaheim company
and the Yorba irrigators were able to prevent the loss of a
considerable quantity of water in the river bed by arranging
to have the Anaheim company deliver water to the Yorba
ditch from the Cajon Canal instead of releasing it into the
river bed so that the Yorba irrigators could divert it down
stream. The trial court could reasonably conclude that
defendants did whatever was reasonably possible to conserve
the water supply and thus applied the water to beneficial
use without waste.
[4] In 1876 plaintiffs' predecessors in interest deeded
the right of way ft)r the Cajon Canal to the Canon de Santa
Ana Water yompany. The deeds Mntained a provision that
the grantors should "have the same privileges as full stockholders in obtaining water," and should "be supplied with
the same at the lowest rate at which water is furnished,"
and should "have free of cost all water necessary for domestic purposes and for watering stock at convenient places on
the said canal. " Plaintiffs contend that this provision created
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a servitude in their favor in the canal. Although the predecessor in interest of the Anaheim company acquired the right
of way by prescription and not by conveyance from the
Canon de Santa Ana Water Company, plaintiffs contend that
the right of way was not acquired adversely to their servitude. It is unnecessary to decide whether the provision in
the deeds was sufficient to create a servitude in the canal in
favor of the grantors that would be binding on successors
in interest of the grantee. In the 1885 action the Anaheim
company asserted its rights in the Cajon Canal against plaintiffs' predecessors in interest. The answer denied that the
Anaheim company owned the canal. Accordingly, the trial
court could reasonably conclude that the Anaheim company
asserted rights in the canal adversely, not only to the Canon
de Santa Ana Water Company, but to plaintiffs' predecessors
in interest as well. Thus the alleged servitude, if it existed
at RD, was extinguished by the running of the statutory
period after 1885.
[5] Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in finding that certain parcels of their land no longer have riparian
rights in the river. If plaintiffs had been successful in
establishing the priority of riparian rights over defendants'
appropriative rights, the findings with respect to which parcels still enjoy riparian rights would be material in determining how much of the water plaintiffs could reasonably use
on their riparian lands. (See Cal. Const., art. XIV. § S.)
Since, however. defendants have established a superior prescriptive right against all of the plaintiffs to divert half of
the normal surface flow of the river into the Cajon Canal,
the question of which of plaintiffs' lands still enjoy riparian
rights is immaterial for the purposes of this action. This
question might become important. however, between plaintiffs themselves with respect to the subsurface flow of the
river that is not diverted by the Anaheim company and the
Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Company. It might also become important if either of those companies stopped or reduced their present diversions. which together absorb the
entire normal surface flow of the river. Since. however, the
question is no longer material in this action. and since its
determination might raise serious problems of res judicata
in the event of future litigation among plaintiffs themselves.
it is inappropriate that it should be determined in an action
in which they have not taken adversary positions. For the
same reasons no determination should be made of the ques-
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tion whether certain of the plaintiffs are or are not the
owners of the fee of the railroad right of way crossing their
lands.
Accordingly, to the extent that the judgment determines
that certain of plaintiffs' lands are not riparian to the river,
and to the extent that it determines that certain plaintiffs are
not the owners of the railroad right of way, it is reversed.
In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Defendants
are to recover costs on this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August
6,1953.
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